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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support 
for four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy






















































































































































































Territory and Deterritorialisation: Kurdistan
Simplifying a complex question, one may observe that the objectives of all 
Kurdish political movements of the past century have concerned two central 
issues, culture and territory. The Kurdish language and the region historically 
known as Kurdistan are the Kurds’ most important national symbols. It is only 
seemingly a paradox that many of the most active participants in the present 
Kurdish movement (especially so in the case of Turkey’s Kurds) speak but little 
Kurdish and have long lived outside Kurdistan. Pre-modem Kurdish uprisings 
were mostly directed against outside interference in the affairs of local 
communities; the insurgents as well as their leaders had strong local roots and 
usually spoke the same Kurdish dialect. Ideas of a common Kurdish identity or 
of Kurdistan as a natural territorial unit, however, did not occur to them. These 
ideas are not entirely a modem development — we find them quite explicitly 
expressed in the work of the seventeenth-century poet Ehmede Xani — but only 
in the twentieth century did they get something of a wider appeal. The first 
Kurdish nationalist associations were established, significantly, outside 
Kurdistan, and in Kurdistan itself it was only in the largest and most modem 
towns that initially gained some influence.
Ernest Gellner defines nationalism, in the first sentence of his celebrated 
study, as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent”.1 Nationalist sentiment, he continues, is a 
feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle (or a feeling of 
satisfaction due to its fulfilment). The Kurdish case appears at first sight an 
appropriate illustration of this definition. Often heard complaints of nationalist 
Kurds concern the division of Kurdistan and the incorporation of its parts into 
different states, each of which is dominated by other ethnic groups: a double 
violation of the principle. There have been no serious attempts, however, to 
establish an independent united Kurdistan; all political movements of this 
century, with the partial exception of the PKK, have concentrated their efforts 
on only one part of Kurdistan. This was at least in part due, no doubt, to the fact 
that these movements were generally dependent on the support or at least 
connivance of a neighbouring country and needed the Kurdish parts of 
neighbour states as supply routes and relatively safe zones to take refuge to in 
the face of an irresistible government offensive. All major movements have 
moreover, if only for pragmatic reasons, accepted the political incorporation of 
their national unit in the existing states and only demanded moderate forms of 
self-rule. Their professed objectives were variants of the Iraqi KDP’s slogan, 
“Autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for all of Iraq”.



























































































The name of Kurdistan (or its Arabic equivalent, diyar al-Akrad), which 
denotes a territory of which the Kurds are the most conspicuous though by no 
means the only inhabitants, has been in common use for at least six centuries — 
at least until it was banned in Turkey in the late 1920s. Apart from a gradual 
expansion in north-western direction in the course of that period, oriental 
authors are in general agreement as to the geographical extent of that territory, 
although it never was politically united.2 There were, until the early nineteenth 
century, dozens of semi-independent Kurdish emirates but no overarching 
confederate structure. The larger entities into which the emirates were 
integrated were vast multiethnic empires, and none of these empires ever 
incorporated all of them. Kurdistan was divided between the Iranian and 
Ottoman empires in the 16th century, and the Ottoman part was broken up 
further into Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian parts in the wake of the First World War. 
Although the pragmatic demands of most Kurdish political leaders concern only 
the parts within the borders of their respective states, the territory that has 
emotional significance is Kurdistan, not any of its constituent parts.3
Kurdistan never was the land of the Kurds alone; its population was 
ethnically and religiously highly heterogeneous. Historical Armenia and 
Kurdistan overlapped to a great extent, and presently Assyrian (Aramaic 
speaking Christian) nationalists prefer the name of Beth Nahrain 
(Mesopotamia) as a non-ethnic designation for (part of) the same region. 
Following the massacres of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
Kurds’ erstwhile Armenian and Assyrian neighbours mostly survive in the 
diaspora. In the course of the past century, voluntary or forced displacement has 
been the experience of ever more Kurds too. In their new places of residence, a 
large proportion of them have retained or rediscovered a strong sense of 
Kurdish identity and instead of gradually merging with the host populations or 
other migrants from the same wider region they have organised themselves in
2 The seventeenth-century Turkish traveller, Evliya Celebi, gives a generous description of its 
extent: “It is a vast territory: from its northern extreme in Erzurum it stretches by Van, Hakkari, 
Cizre, 'Amadiya, Mosul, Shahrazur, Harir and Ardalan to Baghdad, Dama, Dartang and even as 
far as Basra: seventy day’s journeys of rocky Kurdistan. If the six thousand Kurdish tribes and 
clans in these high mountains would not constitute a firm barrier between [Persia] and the 
Ottomans, it would be an easy matter for the Persians to invade Asia Minor. (...) Kurdistan is not 
as wide as it is long. From Harir and Ardalan on the Persian frontier in the east to Damascus and 
Aleppo [in the west], its width varies from twenty-five to fifteen day’s journeys. In these vast 
territories live five hundred thousand musket-bearing Shafi'i Muslims. And there are 776 
fortresses, all of them intact”. (Seyahatname, book IV, ms. Topkapi Bagdat K. 305, fol. 219a).
3 The Turkish, Iraqi and other parts o f Kurdistan do not have their own distinctive names. 
There are regions in Kurdistan with well-established names and distinctive identities, such as 





























































































Kurdish diasporas. Due to a combination of political factors and technological 
developments, these diasporas have increasingly become (re-)oriented towards 
the part of Kurdistan and the state of origin. This is, of course, a well-known 
phenomenon among other migrant groups too, and there has recently been a 
boom in studies of diasporas and transnationalism.
The term “transnational” is commonly used to refer to various types of 
social relations and interactions that transcend “national” boundaries. Like the 
term “national”, which is used by some to refer to states and by others to 
political communities that are not necessarily (and in fact, in most cases are not) 
co-extensive with states, the term “transnational” may also cause confusion by 
conflating rather different types of situations. It is obviously an appropriate term 
to refer to the network of contacts and the complex of activities connecting 
Kurdish communities in Germany, Great Britain and Turkey, but I would object 
to its use for networks linking the Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian parts of Kurdistan 
because in the latter case the essential element of distance from the homeland is 
lacking.4 (“Trans-state” or “cross-border” would be more appropriate terms 
here). There are, in the case of the Kurds, a number of different diasporic 
situations to which the term “transnational” may be more or less appropriate.
Numerous Kurds were displaced within Kurdistan but across state 
borders, e.g. the Kurds from Turkey who resettled in north-eastern Syria to 
escape the repression that followed the rebellions of the 1920sand 1930s, the 
50,000 Iraqi Kurds who fled to Iran during and immediately following the 
1974-75 war (of whom part still remain in Iran), and the 65,000 fleeing to 
Turkey during Iraq’s genocidal Anfal campaign.5 A similar case is that of the 
Kurdish guerrilla movements that have operated from base camps in other parts 
of Kurdistan, across state borders. One is not inclined to speak in these cases of 
diasporas and transnationalism, because the displaced still live among other 
Kurds, but these cases have in fact much in common with those that are 
discussed below.
Very large numbers of Kurds have migrated from Kurdistan to another 
part of the state of which they are citizens. Throughout the centuries Kurdish 
tribes were resettled in central and western Anatolia, in north-eastern or eastern
4 One leading scholar of diaspora questions, Gabriel Scheffer, repeatedly used the term 
"diaspora” in connection with the Kurds living in these different parts o f Kurdistan, but this 
appears to reflect the misconception that the Kurds ended up in several neighbour countries 
because they were dispersed from their homelands.
5 For more on these population movements see my “Shifting national and ethnic identities: the 





























































































Iran.6 Due to deportations, labour migration and flight from the war, millions of 
Kurds now live in such cities as Istanbul, Izmir, Tehran, Abadan, Baghdad, 
Basra and Damascus. Sources close to the Turkish government have even 
claimed that more than half of Turkey’s Kurds now live in central and western 
Turkey. I believe that this is an exaggeration, but the very fact of this 
exaggeration indicates how politically significant the diaspora phenomenon is. 
(Optimistically, Turkey’s authorities appear to believe that massive migration 
will automatically solve the Kurdish question).
The most significant diasporas, however, are constituted by those Kurds 
who went further afield and left both Kurdistan and the state to which they 
belonged. The nineteenth century witnessed a large-scale migration of Yezidi 
Kurds to Russian-controlled Transcaucasia (the present republics of Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan), and under Stalin a large proportion of the 
Transcaucasian Kurds were deported to Central Asia and Siberia, where many 
still remain.7 Since de-Stalinisation, however, the Soviet Kurds have played a 
major role in the development of modem Kurdish culture, and through their 
printed media but especially radio broadcasts from Yerevan they have had a 
considerable impact on the national awareness of the Kurds in Kurdistan.
Labour migration from Turkey, beginning in the 1960s, resulted in very 
large Kurdish communities in Lebanon, Germany and other West European 
states, Libya, Russia, Australia. Students and political refugees have since the 
late 1970s played a crucial role in organising and politicising these diasporas. 
Ethnic awareness among these workers’ communities was in the beginning 
almostjion-existent: the migrants in Europe had come there as ‘Turkish guest 
workers” and this remained long their most relevant identity. Only gradually did 
specifically Kurdish networks and associations emerge within these 
communities. From the 1980s on, these communities’ orientation towards 
developments in Kurdistan and Turkey was considerably strengthened, and 
(political and cultural) organisations that transcended local and state boundaries 
became ever more prominent among them. In the present paper I shall be 
especially concerned with the last-named Kurdish communities and their 
relations both with the host societies and with their countries of origin.
6 Until recently, it was hardly known how many Kurds had lived in central and western 
Anatolia before the recent mass migration. It was in the European diaspora that these 
Anatolian Kurds discovered about each other and began investigating their history and 
cultural traditions. They now publish a cultural journal, Bimebun, devoted to these subjects, 
in Stockholm. A first survey of the central Anatolian Kurds was made by Nuh Ate?, / f  
Anadolu Kiirtleri (Koln: KOMKAR, 1992).
7 Ismet Cheriff Vanly, ‘T he Kurds in the Soviet Union”, in: Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan 





























































































There is an intimate connection between exile and nationalism. The experience of 
exile has been part and parcel of the history of Kurdish nationalism. The exiling 
of Kurdish leaders who were considered as rebellious or otherwise dangerous was 
standard practice in Iran as well as the Ottoman Empire well before the era of 
nationalism, and it continued in the successor states as one of the standard 
government responses to expressions of Kurdish self-awareness. The resettlement 
of tribes was one of the means by which both empires maintained control of their 
territories; by the seventeenth century there were already considerable Kurdish 
populations in northeastern and eastern Iran as well as in central and even western 
Anatolia. In response to the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s, Turkey adopted 
mass deportations as a policy of “nation-building”. The 1934 Resettlement Law 
explicitly states that its aim was to assimilate the bearers of other cultures (i.e., 
primarily the Kurds) to Turkish culture. Although the law was not implemented 
all over Kurdistan, many tribes were deported wholesale in accordance with it.8 In 
more recent years, the suppression of the Kurdish armed insurrections in Iraq and 
Turkey (and to a lesser extent that in Iran) have led to enormous population 
displacements, forcing millions to leave their villages and, in most cases, the 
wider region. Exile from Kurdistan, in these cases, was a consequence of 
nationalism.
But there is yet another relationship between exile and nationalism. The 
awareness of Kurdistan as a homeland, and of the Kurds as a distinct people, has 
often been strongest in those Kurds who lived elsewhere, among people of 
different languages and cultures. The first Kurdish associations were established 
in Istanbul and more distant places of exile, by Kurds who had studied in other 
languages and had been exposed to modem ideas. It was exile that brought 
educated Kurds of different regional backgrounds together and thereby helped 
them to imagine Kurdistan as their common fatherland. It was exile that 
transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical entity into a political 
ideal.
Kurdish Journalism and Exile
A century ago, in 1898, the first Kurdish journal, Kurdistan, began publication. 
Significantly it was not in Kurdistan or even Istanbul, the political and cultural
8 The text o f the law and a critical analysis are given in: Ismail Beçikçi, Kiirtlerin ‘mecburi 
iskan'i (Ankara: Komal, 1977); see also: Martin van Bruinessen, “Genocide in Kurdistan? 
The suppression of the Dersim rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against the 
Iraqi Kurds (1988)”, in: George J. Andreopoulos (ed). Conceptual and historical dimensions 




























































































centre of the Ottoman Empire, that the first issues were printed but in Cairo, 
which was out of reach of the sultan’s censorship and where a number of 
opposition journals were also published. There was only a very small Kurdish 
community in Cairo then, and when the editor, Abdurrahman Bedirkhan, left 
Cairo after the first five issues, he handed the journal over to his brother Siireyya, 
who lived in Geneva. After fourteen issues published in Switzerland, the journal 
briefly returned to Cairo, from where it moved on to London. In spite of these 
peregrinations and the sultan’s censorhip, copies of the journal reached Kurdistan 
by devious routes. From readers’ letters published in the journal we know that it 
found an avid readership in different parts of Kurdistan, apparently unhindered by 
the great variety of Kurdish dialects. There may have been a few readers in 
foreign exile too, but the audience that Kurdistan targeted consisted of the 
educated Kurdish elite in Kurdistan and Istanbul. It had the aim of spreading 
enlightened ideas and knowledge of the wider world among the Kurds — and this 
appeared to be only possible from foreign exile.
For a few years following the Young Turk coup d’état of 1908, and briefly 
again in the aftermath of the First World War, Kurdish journals could appear in 
Istanbul.9 Republican Turkey and Iran under the Pahlavi shahs banned the 
Kurdish press again and only Iraq allowed a number of Kurdish journals and 
magazines to appear. For most of the twentieth century the Kurdish press was 
largely a press in exile. The most famous Kurdish journal ever, Hawar, was 
published in Syria in the 1930s and early 1940s, when this country was ruled by 
the French.10 In the 1960s, Kurdish publishing shifted to Europe again, where the 
number of Kurdish students at European universities was gradually increasing. 
The first Kurdish journals in Europe were produced by and for students, but 
gradually the students turned to the much larger community of immigrant 
workers. With the emergence of an ethnic awareness among the latter, and 
especially with the arrival of large numbers of Kurdish political refugees in the 
1980s and 1990s, there was a growing audience for a Kurdish press in Europe 
itself.
9 Very few copies o f these journals have survived. It was again Kurdish intellectuals living in 
European exile who published facsimile editions of some of the major journals of that period, 
at last making them available to a larger Kurdish audience. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan deserves 
especial mention in this connection for his useful annotated re-editions of Kurdistan, Kurd 
Te'aviin ve Terakki Gazetesi and Jin. For a discourse analysis of the Istanbul-based journals of 
this period, see: Janet Klein, Claiming the nation: the origins and nature of Kurdish 
nationalist discourse, a study of the Kurdish press in the Ottoman Empire (M.A. thesis, 
Princeton University, 1996).
10 Hawar too, as well as the less famous Kurdish journals Roja NR and Ronahi, that the 
French mandate authorities allowed to appear during the Second World War, only found a 




























































































The first Kurdish student union in Europe, KSSE, was established in Wiesbaden 
(West Germany) in 1956. It initially had only eighteen members who hailed from 
different parts of Kurdistan (but mostly from the Iraqi and Syrian parts) and who 
studied in different European countries. In two decades, their number increased to 
almost three thousand, on both sides of the iron curtain." Iraqi and Syrian 
students still dominated the organisation, and it remained primarily concerned 
with the events in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Mulla Mustafa Barzani had since 1961 
led an armed struggle for autonomy. Following the final collapse of Barzani’s 
rebellion in 1975, the first groups of (Iraqi) Kurdish political refugees came to 
Europe. They strengthened the ranks of the students’ movement and further 
politicised it. The divisions in the Kurdish movement in Iraq were reflected in 
divisions in the student movement. A rival union to KSSE, named AKSA, was 
established, so that the rival parties in Iraq, KDP and PUK, each had their parallel 
students’ organisation in Europe.
Earlier, in the mid-1960s, a number of Kurdish students from Turkey had 
established a separate organisation that more closely followed the developments 
in Turkish Kurdistan, where an important part of the Kurdish movement was 
allied with the political left. (Other Kurdish students from Turkey, however, 
joined the KSSE and oriented themselves towards Barzani’s movement in Iraq). 
This association was also the first Kurdish organisation that attempted to reach 
out to the Kurdish migrant workers who were arriving in Western Europe from 
Turkey. It was students and former students who, in the 1970s, established the 
first Kurdish workers’ association, KOMKAR, which in the course of time grew 
into a federation of dozens of local organisations, at first in Germany only but 
later also in the Netherlands, France and other countries.
Kurdish Migrant Workers in Europe
In the 1960s, when the economies of north-western Europe were rapidly growing 
and there was a shortage of labour, workers were recruited from the 
Mediterranean region: Italy, Spain and Greece first, but then increasingly 
Morocco and Turkey. In 1973 active recruitment was stopped but the stream of 
newcomers continued. Few of the earlier migrants returned to their home 
countries. Most had come single at first but after a number of years brought their 
spouses and children. Other relatives and acquaintances came as “tourists” in the 
hope of finding work through informal channels. The large men’s dormitories of 
the early years gave way to family-based immigrant communities, that began 1
Kurdish Students in Europe




























































































building their own institutions: shops, cafés, mosques, sports clubs and various 
types of associations.
The first labour migrants from Turkey were recruited from the western and 
central parts of the country, and the Kurds were therefore under-represented 
among them. The balance changed in the course of the 1970s, when the 
proportion of migrants from eastern Turkey increased. Most of these migrants 
thought of themselves primarily as Turks in Europa, however, even if they 
belonged to such ethnic or religious minority groups in Turkey as the Kurds or 
the Alevis. Many of them had internalised, or were reluctant to challenge, 
Turkey’s official doctrine that every citizen of Turkey is a Turk. Only gradually 
did these immigrants in Europe “rediscover” or dare to emphasise their Kurdish 
identity. This process of rediscovery, which owes much to the activities of 
Kurdish students, and later of political refugees, is still going on. The so-called 
second generation, consisting of immigrant workers’ children who have grown up 
in Europe, tend to be much more interested in Kurdish identity and Kurdish 
politics than their parents were. Many parents returned to their Kurdish roots 
under the influence of their children.
KOMKAR, the first federation of Kurdish workers’ associations, was 
politically affiliated with one of the political movements that had emerged in 
Turkey in the early 1970s, the Ôzgürliik Yolu group.12 Unlike many of the later 
Kurdish associations in Europe, however, it deliberately decided to concentrate 
all its efforts on activities directly relevant to the interests of Kurdish workers in 
Europe, not on the national struggle in Kurdistan and Turkey. It was only due to 
the influx of large numbers of refugees during the 1980s that the focus of interest 
of all associations shifted ever more to the country and region of origin. The 
activities in Europe came increasingly to be geared to the needs of the political 
and military struggle for Kurdistan.
Political Refugees
The violent suppression of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq, Iran and 
Turkey caused large population movements. Tens of thousands of Kurds ended 
up as displaced persons and refugees in the 1970s, hundreds of thousands in the 
1980s, millions in the 1990s. Only a tiny fraction of them ever reached Europe, 
but they made a much larger impact there than the much more numerous Kurdish 
immigrant workers.
12 Thus named after the monthly journal it published, Ôzgürliik Yolu (“The road to freedom"). 
Later the group became better known by the name of the clandestine political party that 




























































































In 1975 the movement of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who had been fighting 
for autonomy within Iraq, collapsed. Barzani had been receiving Iranian, Israeli 
and covert American support and had for a year governed a large part of Iraqi 
Kurdistan as “liberated areas”. When the shah could make a favourable deal with 
Saddam Hussein, he sacrificed his Kurdish allies in exchange for a few boundary 
concessions. He allowed refugees to enter his country, however. Some fifty 
thousand Kurdish guerrilla fighters, peasants and townspeople, fearing Saddam’s 
revenge, fled to Iran. Some of these refugees applied for asylum in European 
countries, and a number of them, generally the most highly educated, were 
admitted to Europe. The Netherlands, for instance, granted asylum to several 
dozens of them. They were the first Kurdish political prisoners there, and also the 
first educated Kurds, who could express themselves clearly in English. They 
thereby became spokespersons not only for the Iraqi Kurds but for the Kurds in 
general.
The next waves of refugees were the result of the military coup d’état in 
Turkey in 1980 and of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88). Turkey’s military put the 
members of all Kurdish associations as well as independent writers and 
journalists behind prison bars. Those who escaped arrest or were later released 
fled to neighbouring countries first, and part of them later managed to reach 
western Europe. Individual Kurdish intellectuals or activists had in fact been 
fleeing to Europe since the mid-1970s. Due to the heavy repression by the 
military regime, almost all Kurdish intellectuals from Turkey in the end sought 
asylum in Europe, where especially Sweden provided a more favourable 
environment for the conservation and development of Kurdish culture.
Iran’s Kurds had, during the first years after the Islamic revolution, enjoyed 
a degree of de facto self-rule, exercised by Kurdish political parties. When the 
central government brought all of the Kurdish districts under its control again, all 
people who were too closely associated with these Kurdish parties had to flee the 
country. Neither Iraq nor Turkey proved safe to them, and many of them also 
ended up in Europe. The Iranian regime carried its struggle against the Kurdish 
movement to European soil too, assassinating Kurdish leaders in Vienna, Cyprus 
and Berlin.
In the course of the war, Iraq destroyed a large part of the Kurdish 
countryside, especially after the (Iraqi) Kurdish political parties started co­
operating militarily with Iran. At the end of the war, it carried out a genocidal 
military campaign (nicknamed Anfal) against all regions that had been under 
Kurdish control. Poison gas was used in the first attacks; the surviving villagers 
were deported and their villages completely destroyed. More than a hundred 




























































































most of them had been summarily executed and buried in mass graves.13 The last 
phase of the Anfal campaign took place near the Turkish border, and some 70,000 
Kurds managed to escape into Turkey. The Turkish government refused to 
recognise them as refugees and sent many of them back to Iraq. Through 
international channels, small numbers were accepted as refugees in Europe.
The mass flight from Iraqi Kurdistan was repeated, on a much larger scale, 
in the wake of the war over Kuwait. Responding to President Bush’ call and 
believing Saddam’s military power destroyed, the Kurds had massively rebelled. 
When Iraqi troops brutally suppressed this uprising, well over a million Kurds 
fled for their lives towards the Iranian and Turkish borders. Western powers 
intervened and established a “safe haven” in northern Iraq, in part to relieve 
Turkey from the threat of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Few people 
felt really safe in the “safe haven”, however, and over the past eight years tens of 
thousands have left it in the hope of finding a safer refuge elsewhere.
In the 1990s, Turkey repeated on a slightly more modest scale Iraq’s 
counter-insurgency measures of the 1980s. Thousands of villages were destroyed 
and the inhabitants forced to leave, in order to deny the PKK guerrilla fighters 
civilian support.14 Death squads killed thousands of Kurdish politicians, lawyers, 
journalists and community leaders.15 Millions were uprooted, leaving their 
villages for towns and cities in the region, and the Kurdish region for western 
Turkey. Tens of thousands of them attempted to reach Western Europe and find 
political asylum there. Political refugees have come to constitute an important 
part of the Kurdish communities in Europe.16
13 Peter Galbraith, “Chemical weapons use in Kurdistan: Iraq’s final offensive”, Staff report to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington: U.S. Goverment 
Printing Office, 1988); Human Rights Watch /Middle East, Iraq's crime of genocide (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
14 The only detailed study of forced village evacuations and village destruction was published 
by the Netherlands Kurdistan Society: Forced evictions and destruction o f villages in Dersim 
(Tunceli) and western Bingol, September-November 1994 (Amsterdam: Stichting Nederland- 
Koerdistan, 1995).
15 See: Martin van Bruinessen, “Turkey’s death squads”, Middle East Report #199 (Spring 
1996). 20-23.
16 For a study of Kurdish refugees in Finland and Britain, see: Osten Wahlbeck, Kurdish 




























































































Exile and Kurdish Culture
Newroz
Newroz, the Kurdish New Year that is celebrated on the 21st of March, was first 
adopted by Iraq’s Kurds as their own national holiday in the 1950s. In imitation 
of the Kurdish movement in Iraq, the Kurdish students’ unions in Europe began 
organising Newroz parties, with music and dance and speeches. Through the first 
Newroz parties, the students also attempted to reach out to Kurdish workers and 
to make them more aware of their Kurdish identity. In my own country, the 
Netherlands, Newroz celebrations began after the arrival of the first group of Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees in 1975. Initially they involved just the Iraqi Kurds and their 
Dutch friends and other guests, with only a few Turkish Kurds participating, but 
each year the number of Kurds from Turkey increased. In the 1980s, the Newroz 
parties came to be dominated by Kurds from Turkey, because ever more migrant 
workers were mobilised and many educated people fled from Turkey to Europe. 
Among the refugees there were, moreover, Kurdish singers, musicians and actors, 
who made a significant impact. Newroz became more and more politicised, 
however. Each political party or organisation held its own Newroz celebrations, 
which assumed the character of political rallies instead of just occasions for 
listening to music and song, dancing and dining together. Those organised by the 
PKK distinguished themselves, especially in the first years, i.e. the early 1980s, 
by their obsession with physical oppression by the state and their calls for violent 
struggle for liberation. Newroz celebrations became the major social events where 
the Kurdish communities visibly manifested themselves. Whereas in the 1970s a 
typical Newroz party might be attended by several hundred people, those of the 
1990s drew up to several tens of thousands of participants of all ages. In spite of 
their political character, they were family events, attended by people of all ages.
Language and Literature in Exile
Students and refugees also made efforts to cultivate the Kurdish language and to 
use it as a focus around which to mobilise Kurdish national awareness. This was 
especially important for the Kurds from Turkey, where Kurdish was banned. In 
the late 1970s, the first Kurdish literacy courses were organised in various 
European countries. Many Kurds have for the first time learnt to read and write 
Kurdish in Europe. The discovery of Kurdish as a written language with a written 
literature placed it on the same level as Turkish and did much for Kurdish self­
esteem.17 As another consciousness-raiser, KOMKAR began a campaign for the
17 Although this “discovery” was to some extent also an “invention of tradition”, as is 
common for national symbols deliberately embraced by nationalists (as argued by Hobsbawm 




























































































right of Kurdish immigrant children to learn Kurdish instead of Turkish as their 
“mother tongue” in school. (Thus far, mother tongue education had always been 
education in the official language of the state of origin). Only Sweden and 
Denmark granted that right, but the campaign succeeded in convincing many 
Kurds of the importance of their language.
In the 1960s several new Kurdish journals and some booklets were 
published by the students’ unions in Europe. They did not have a wide 
distribution but were important because they contained work by the major 
Kurdish poets and authors (who could not publish in Turkey or Syria).18 The first 
journals directed at the larger audience of Kurdish immigrant workers, published 
in the 1970s, used Turkish rather than Kurdish because of the general low literacy 
in Kurdish. It took another decade and a half for Kurdish to become increasingly 
used and understood in written communications.
There was a sudden upsurge of publishing in Kurdish in the second half of 
the 1980s. This was directly related to the Turkish military coup of 1980, which 
caused numerous Kurdish artists and intellectuals to leave the country and seek 
asylum in Europe. A whole generation of young Kurdish intellectuals and 
politicians — most of the people of whom I am speaking were bom between 1945 
and 1960 and most of them had had leading roles in political organisations in 
Turkey in the 1970s — was transplanted to Europe. Whereas in Turkey they had 
been obliged to express themselves in Turkish,19 once they lived in Europe they 
were no longer subjected to the ban on Kurdish. In several countries, and 
especially in Sweden, it was even possible to find subsidies for publications in 
Kurdish (as well as other minority languages).
There was yet another factor that contributed to the sudden flourishing of 
Kurdish writing and publishing in the late 1980s, namely the impact of resumed
a half centuries. A major landmark is the elegant epic romance Mem u Zin by Ehmede Xani, 
completed in 169*, which was recognised by the first generations of Kurdish nationalists (as 
well as the Turkish authorities) as a forceful expression of Kurdish national awareness. It was 
first printed in Istanbul in 19** and almost at once banned and all copies destroyed. A new 
edition, with a Turkish translation by Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, was published in 1968 and 
made a major impact before being banned again.
18 There were also a few attempts to publish Kurdish-oriented cultural journals in Turkey in 
the early 1960s, but the journals were closed down almost at once although, apart from an 
occasional folk poem, all contributions were in Turkish. These journals only found a wider 
readership after they were reprinted in Europe in the 1990s.
19 Towards the end of the 1970s, several cultural journals in Turkey in fact published a few 
articles or poems in Kurdish besides Turkish contributions; one short-lived journal, Jina Nu, 
in fact was entirely in Kurdish and Zaza. These journals were banned, and their editors 




























































































contacts with the Soviet Kurds. The latter, especially those of Armenia, could 
boast a well-established literary production. Since the end of Stalinism, the Kurds 
of Armenia (who constituted a relatively small nationality there, numbering only 
approximately 50,000) enjoyed more cultural rights than the Kurds elsewhere in 
the region, and publishing in Kurdish was actually encouraged.20 The Kurdish 
spoken and written in Armenia is, moreover, a form of Kurmanci, which is also 
spoken by most Kurds of Turkey (unlike those of Iraq and Iran, most of whom 
speak southern Sorani dialects). There were two major barriers to communication, 
however: the Iron Curtain itself and the Cyrillic script that was obligatory for 
Kurdish in the Soviet Union and that made Kurdish books and newspapers 
unintelligible for non-Soviet Kurds. It had apparently been Kurdish studying in 
Europe who established the first contacts. The Ozgurliik Yolu group, which had 
some contacts with the Soviet authorities, was the first to publish literary work of 
Soviet Kurdish authors in a latinised transcription. Translations into Turkish of 
historical studies by Soviet kurdologists followed. By the end of the 1980s, due to 
Glasnost, Soviet Kurdish authors found it easier to travel to the West, making a 
more intensive interaction with Kurdish authors originating from Turkey 
possible. More work by Soviet Kurds was republished in Sweden or Germany, 
where it exercised a stimulating influence on the revival of Kurdish language and 
literature among the refugees from Turkey.
Presently, some 40 to 50 books in Kurdish are published each year in 
Sweden alone, about half of them in the northern dialect (Kurmanci) spoken in 
Turkey.21 The number of periodicals is even more impressive. By the latest count, 
between the years 1956 and 1998, no less than 98 journals and bulletins in 
Kurdish (and another 25 journals addressing Kurdish audiences in other 
languages) were published in Sweden.22 France, Germany and England are also 
home to a number of Kurdish journals each.23 The best dictionary of northern
20 See the relevant sections of: Ismet Chériff Vanly, ‘T he Kurds in the Soviet Union”, in: 
Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.J, The Kurds, a contemporary overview (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 193-218, and: Amir Hassanpour, “The creation of Kurdish media 
culture”, in: Philip Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison, eds., Kurdish culture and identity 
(London: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 48-84.
21 M. Tayfun, Kurdiskt forfattarskap och Kurdisk bokutgivning: bakgrund, villkor, betydelse 
(Stockholm: Apec, 1998). The number of books in Kurmanci published in Sweden since 1974 is 
given as 268 by Laleç Qaso (in the Kurdish weekly Ronahi, 7-13 September 1996, 10).
22 Mahmud Lewendi , “Di 100 salîya rojnamegerîya Kurd! de rojname û kovarên ku li Swêdê 
derketine", Çira 15-16 (1998), 103-6.
23 On Kurdish literature produced in Germany (with an emphasis on Kurds of Iraqi origin), 
see: Mahmood Hama Tschawisch, Die kurdische Exilliteratur in Deutschland von den 70er 




























































































Kurdish (Kurmanci) that so far exists was compiled and first printed in Holland.24
It is true that these publications did not have very large circulation, for 
their reading public constituted only a small fraction of the Kurds in Europe.25 
But their readership and contributing authors constituted enough of a critical 
mass for the development of a modem written language. Returning labour 
migrants smuggled books and journals into Turkey, where they initially cannot 
have reached much larger audiences than in Europe. This changed, however, 
when in 1991 the law on publications in other languages than Turkish was 
withdrawn, and books and journals in Turkish could be published inside Turkey 
again. Books that had earlier appeared in Europe were reprinted in Turkey, and 
several Kurdish journals suspended publication in Europe in order to continue 
in Turkey. With one or two short-lived exceptions, however, Kurdish 
publishing in Turkey does not take place in Kurdistan but in Istanbul or Ankara, 
and under often precarious conditions. Many publications were banned and 
confiscated, numerous authors and publishers sentenced to prison terms. And 
even publications that are freely sold in Istanbul are considered as forbidden 
material in Kurdistan. Kurdish literature and Kurdish cultural life in general 
flourishes in an interaction between the three different types of diaspora, 
western Turkey, the former Soviet Union and western Europe. It is quite 
common to find contributions by authors from the three different situations in a 
single journal issue or book.
The revival of Kurmanci as a language actually used (and not just as an 
identity symbol of little use value) is remarkable when compared with the 
situation of other minority languages. Among the Irish, Gaelic has never 
regained the same degree of currency, in spite of at first sight more favourable 
circumstances. The number of Kurmanci speakers has perceptibly increased 
over the past decades. Language courses that were organised throughout Europe 
taught this gradually developing standard language to those who opted for 
Kurdish identity but had Turkish, Zaza or a non-standard Kurmanci dialect as 
their first languages. Both in writing and, as far as I can judge, in oral discourse, 
Kurdish was increasingly often used.26
24 This is: D. izoll, Ferheng: Kurdi-Tirki, Tiirkge-Kiirtqe (The Hague: Komeley Xwendikarani 
Kurd li Ewrupa, 1987). A revised edition was published in Istanbul in 1992, when publishing 
in Kurdish had become legally possible there.
25 Most of the journals published in Sweden have had a circulation of less than 1000. For a 
detailed study of Kurdish publishing in Sweden, see Tayfun, Kurdiskt forfattarskap.
26 The PKK initially was the one Kurdish organisation that appeared not to care much for the 
development of the Kurdish language; all of its publications were in Turkish. More recently it 
has also been giving Kurdish more attention, sponsoring language congresses and, most 




























































































The New Media: Satellite Television and the Internet
The Kurdish print media and Kurdish language courses that can operate in 
western Europe outside the control of the Turkish state have provided the 
Kurdish movement with instruments of nation building comparable to those 
normally used by states. In 1995 a powerful instrument was added to this 
arsenal, the satellite television station MED-TV, which beamed programs to the 
Middle East but could also be received in western Europe and a large part of 
Asia. Video cassettes of its programs were circulated among Kurdish 
communities elsewhere. The station’s weekly fare included news broadcasts, 
lessons in standard Kurmanci Kurdish, old Turkish movies now spoken in 
Kurdish, and, most importantly, live studio discussions with callers-in (by 
telephone) from various parts of the globe.27 One regular caller-in was PKK 
chief Abdullah Ocalan, but there were also more spontaneous calls from such 
places as Diyarbakir or Mahabad, Stockholm or Munich. MED-TV had its 
major studios near Brussels and auxiliary facilities in Koln and Stockholm; 
mobile crews made interviews and filmed events throughout Europe. Most of 
the staff were Kurds from Turkey (Kurmanci and Zaza speakers) but there were 
also several Kurds from the other parts of Kurdistan, who took care of the 
Sorani programs.
The initiative for this television station came from the PKK, but it made 
efforts to present a more pluralistic image, if only to comply with the 
regulations of the (British) Independent Television Commission, which gave the 
station access to a satellite and which monitored the transmissions. Kurds of all 
persuasions were quick to perceive the revolutionary potential of such a station 
and enthusiastically endorsed it. Kurds of diverse backgrounds have been able 
to voice opinions that clearly differed from the PKK party line, without being 
censored. The station soon became very popular in Turkey and Kurdistan itself, 
and in spite of Turkish attempts at jamming and regular police raids on 
parabolic antennas pointing to MED-TV’s satellite it made a great impact. 
Whereas the revival of Kurdish writing affected only a thin layer of educated 
committed to their own culture, MED-TV reached millions, and it became a 
major source of alternative information to those who distrusted Turkey’s
spoke no or a very poor Kurdish, but he now also delivers speeches in flawless Kurdish.
21 The first analysis of MED-TV’s programs and their impact that I am aware of is by Toronto- 
based communications scholar Amir Hassanpour (himself a Kurd from Iran). See his “MED-TV, 
Grossbritannien und der tiirkische Staat: Die Suche einer staatenlosen Nation nach Souveranitat 
lm Ather”, in: Carsten Borck et al. (ed.), Ethnizitat, Nationalismus, Religion und Politik in 
Kurdistan (MUnster: Lit Verlag, 1997), 239-278; and “Satellite footprints as national borders: 
MED-TV and the extraterritoriality of state sovereignty”, Journal o f Muslim Minority Affairs vol 





























































































Understandably, the Turkish authorities were extremely displeased with 
the existence of this independent station, and they used all means available to 
get it from the air. It had to change satellite several times, as Turkey persuaded 
other governments to deny MED-TV access to the facilities they controlled. The 
Belgian police, acting on information from Turkey, searched the studios and 
confiscated all computers, video equipment and documentation, expecting to 
find proof of illegal financial transactions, drug smuggling and child 
kidnapping. (No proof that would stand up in court was found).28 Turkey 
attempted to convince the Independent Television Commission that MED-TV 
was a PKK propaganda outfit and that it incited to terrorist violence. In the 
wake of Ocalan’s arrest and imprisonment in Turkey in February 1999, 
emotional studio guests did in fact make unambiguous calls for violence. This 
was sufficient reason for the Independent Television Commission to suspend 
and then to definitively withdraw MED-TV’s licence.
This was not the end of Kurdish satellite television. Meanwhile Iraq’s 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was engaged in a military and 
propaganda struggle with the PKK, had established its own satellite station 
KTV, which began broadcasting a few hours a day in early 1999. A few months 
later a successor to MED-TV, named CTV, was in the air with non-political 
programs. Most recently, CTV was replaced by a new station, Medya-TV. 
Satellite television is likely to remain a favourite medium for the Kurds to 
continue the struggle for their cultural and political rights, and the number of 
Kurdish stations may further increase, contributing to the (re)integration of the 
Kurdish diasporas and the homeland.
Television is not the only of the new media in which the Kurds have 
invested much effort and money. The most spectacular development has 
perhaps been in the use of the internet. The number of Kurdish websites has 
grown very rapidly over the past few years, and the range of information 
communicated by them is extremely broad, from journalistic and scholarly 
articles to digitalised Kurdish music, from information about events to historical 
photographs, from political propaganda to late medieval Kurdish poetry, from 
daily news to the text of banned books. A growing corpus of modem written
28 Accusations of this nature are repeated by a French criminologist in a Swiss scholarly 
journal: François Haut, “Guerrilla et narcotrafic: le Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan, une 
entité hybride, terroriste et criminelle”. Revue internationale de criminologie et de police 
technique 50 (1997), 233-240. Haut describes the police operation against MED-TV and other 
Kurdish institutions in Belgium as if this by itself constitutes proof of the PKK’s criminal 




























































































Kurdish is becoming available online, and the web is likely to play a crucial part 
in the effort to develop a modem standard language. The major political 
movements have their own homepages, and so do the more important institutes 
as well as numerous individuals.29
Politics In exile
The Kurdish students’ unions of the 1960s were, of course, political associations 
but they were small and their impact on the Kurdish workers in Europe was 
marginal. The arrival of refugees, from Iraq first and then increasingly from 
Turkey, had a much greater effect on the politicisation of the wider Kurdish 
community. They also made a more systematic effort at lobbying on behalf of the 
Kurdish cause, establishing contacts with European political parties, churches and 
various non-governmental organisations.
The wave of political refugees who came from Turkey after the 1980 coup 
constituted in many ways a watershed. Most of the Kurdish parties and 
organisations in Turkey were practically destroyed there. The leaders and cadres 
who took asylum in Europe reorganised their parties here and recruited new 
members among the Kurds resident in Europe. There was by now a large “second 
generation” of young Kurds in their teens and early twenties, who had grown up 
in Europe but who were much more sensitive to appeals to their Kurdish ethnic 
awareness than their parents had been. The party that ultimately was most 
successful in recruiting this young generation was the PKK, which established a 
dense network of students’ and workers’ unions, information offices and 
publishing houses all over Europe. It never was much interested in the situation 
of Kurds in Europe; all of its activities were geared to support for the struggle in 
Kurdistan. Other organisations, most notably KOMKAR, on the other hand, 
continued to focus primarily on the needs and rights of Kurdish workers in 
Europe. Even these organisations, however, experienced the shift in orientation 
that all Turkish organisations in Europe experienced during the 1980s, and 
became more responsive to developments in Turkey than those in Europe. This 
reorientation was partly due to the large influx of political refugees and other
~9 Some interesting Kurdish websites, with links to numerous other ones, are:
The Paris Kurdish Institute: http://www.institutkurde.org/home.htm 
Kurdistan Web: http://kurdweb.humanrights.de/
Ocalan's lawyers’ site: http://www.asrinhukuk.com/
Arif Zerevan's site (with poetry, music, art): www.nefel.nu/





























































































party workers,30 partly a consequence of such technological developments as 
direct telephone and fax links and, especially, satellite television, which brought 
friends and relatives in Turkey or whatever part of Kurdistan nearer than one’s 
closest German neighbours.
Institutions
The Kurdish Institute of Paris, founded in 1983 by Kurdish intellectuals living 
in various European countries, with the support of France’s then socialist 
government, is the first major Kurdish institution in Europe. It is at once a 
cultural and social centre for the Kurdish community in Paris, a study and 
documentation centre with a large research library, and a modest diplomatic 
mission. It is not affiliated with any specific Kurdish party or association but it 
has facilitated meetings of Kurdish politicians of various parties with European 
officials and politicians. It publishes a number of journals and bulletins, and it 
has pioneered attempts to develop a standard for northern Kurdish (Kurmanci) 
through a series of conferences attended by many Kurdish authors and through 
a journal in which the agreed upon standard terms are published. Later, Kurdish 
institutes were also founded in Brussels (1989), Berlin (1994), Moscow (1996) 
and Washington DC (1996), as well as a well-endowed Kurdish library in 
Stockholm (1997). Each of these institutes differs from the others in 
constituency and types of activity, but all of them have contributed to the 
consolidation and strengthening of Kurdish language and culture. The 
Washington Kurdish Institute, because of its location, has begun playing an 
important role in political lobbying on behalf of the Kurds.
Besides these institutes, two Kurdish human rights organisations, 
established in important European capitals, have worked very effectively in the 
European political arena. Both the Bonn-based International Association for 
Human Rights in Kurdistan (close to the OzgiirlUk Yolu group) and the 
London-based Kurdistan Human Rights Project (independent, but perceived to 
be close to the PKK) have been effective lobbyists at various European 
institutions. They have also, among other things, initiated or supported a 
growing number of court cases against Turkey before the European Court of
10 Parallel developments took place within almost all Turkish and Kurdish organisations that 
had been active in Europe since before 1980. Their founders were in most cases ideologically 
affiliated with parent parties or organisations in Turkey but defined their objectives within the 
European context. The arrival as refugees of high-ranking members of the parent 
organisations led inevitably to conflicts o f authority and disagreements over policy. The 
refugees understandably saw their futures not in Europe but in Turkey or Kurdistan and 





























































































Human Rights, consistently leading to condemnations of Turkey.
The Kurdish Parliament in Exile and the Kurdish National Congress
The Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which was established in 1995 and held its first 
session in the Netherlands, played a significant part in placing the Kurdish 
question on the European political agendas. It acts as a Kurdish diplomatic 
representation and has established contact with numerous parties and 
personalities in Europe. Some of its core members had represented the pro- 
Kurdish party HEP in Turkey’s parliament and asked for asylum in Europe when 
their immunities were lifted and they were threatened with imprisonment for 
“separatism”. Other members represented various Kurdish associations and 
constituencies, most of them close to the PKK. This parliament is transnational 
in more than one respect. Most obviously, it is itself part of the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe. It is “trans-state” in that, although established by Kurds 
from Turkey, it includes at least one member from Iraqi Kurdistan and attempts 
to strengthen the representation of the other parts. Finally it is transnational in 
that its members have political asylum in different European states and that, 
although it has permanent offices in Brussels, it has held its plenary sessions 
each time in a different European country, including the Netherlands, Austria, 
Denmark, Russia and Italy. In the last-named two countries it could convene in 
the national parliament buildings and was addressed by members of various 
political parties in the host country.
The Kurdish Parliament in Exile never lost the stigma of being a PKK 
front, however, and it never seriously deviated from the PKK party line. For this 
reason it did not succeed in bridging the gap with other Kurdish political currents, 
and its diplomatic successes also remained limited. In 1998 the PKK started 
negotiations with other parties and organisations about the establishment of a 
more broadly representative platform, a Kurdish National Congress (modelled, it 
would appear, on the Palestinian National Congress). When Ocalan was forced to 
leave Syria and temporarily ended up in Italy in November 1998, the preparations 
for the constitutive meeting of this congress were speeded up. Ocalan met with a 
surprising range of Kurdish personalities, including political opponents, and for a 
brief period it seemed that the PKK was renouncing on its claim to be the sole 
representative of the Kurds’ national will and Ocalan would have to accept other 
leaders beside himself.
Many of the smaller parties and organisations indicated their willingness to 
take part in the planned National Congress, but the two large Iraqi Kurdish 
parties, PUK and KDP, which could not do without good working relations with 




























































































join,3' and the Iranian KDP-I and the Socialist Party of (Turkish) Kurdistan, the 
most important of the PKK’s rivals, also showed little enthusiasm. Ocalan’s 
unexpected departure from Italy in January and his ultimate capture in February 
put the PKK in disarray and thwarted further plans for inter-party co-operation. 
At the same time, however, Ocalan’s capture by Turkey unleashed strong 
emotions among Kurds of all political persuasions and a sense of unity that had 
rarely been experienced before. This may have been the reason that the National 
Congress, when it finally held its inaugurating session in Amsterdam on May 24, 
1999, appeared to be remarkably pluralistic. Both Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan 
were strongly represented by prominent and influential personalities. In spite of 
the abstention of the major parties as such, personalities known to be close to 
them did attend. Although the congress was unmistakably engineered by the 
PKK, this time a large proportion of the participants were men and women 
without previous links with this party, including experienced politicians, 
academics, and religious leaders of considerable charisma.31 2 The National 
Congress may prove to represent a major step in Kurdish nation-building that 
would not have been possible in Kurdistan itself but only in the diaspora.
The Contributions of the Diaspora to Kurdish Culture and Politics
The Kurdish diaspora is no longer marginal to what happens in Kurdistan but 
plays an increasingly central role. The history of the Kurdish diaspora illustrates, 
even more clearly than developments in Kurdistan itself, the process of 
resurgence of Kurdish identity after a period of gradual incorporation into the 
Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian would-be nation-states. A large part of it, after all, 
started out as a Turkish diaspora, having come as ‘Turkish guest-workers” and 
establishing its first diaspora networks in the form of Turkish mosques, Turkish 
cafés, Turkish workers’ associations, Turkish newspapers and journals, Turkey- 
oriented businesses, etc. Significant Kurdish networks did not emerge before the 
mid-1970s, and in fact many people kept a foot in the Turkish as well as the 
Kurdish diasporas, which were never completely separated from one another. As 
long as Kurdish students and refugees were few in number, Kurds from Iraq,
31 In the case of the KDP there were even more pressing reasons to reject all forms of co­
operation. The PKK had for several years been fighting the KDP in northern Iraq, and the war 
continued even as the PKK called for the reunion of all Kurds.
12 The Parliament in Exile had also a few religious personalities among its members, carefully 
selected to represent the Sunni, Alevi and Yezidi communities as well as the Christian 
minorities of Kurdistan, but these persons owed their reputation as religious authorities to 
their being treated as such by the PKK rather than to independent qualities of their own. 
Among the delegates to the National Congress, however, there were personalities such as 
Shaykh Ezzeddin Huseyni, who at the time of the Iranian revolution had been the most 




























































































Turkey, Syria and Iran associated together but when the numbers kept increasing, 
all went their own ways. Each group established their own networks, which 
overlapped but little with those of the Kurds from their neighbour countries. It 
was only a relatively small number of individuals who made serious efforts to 
bridge the gap and integrate the Kurds into one single diaspora network. It should 
be admitted that the PKK. although clearly Turkey-oriented, has been more 
successful than earlier Kurdish parties in drawing Kurds from the other states into 
its orbit, as can be easily observed at its cultural manifestations. The strong 
response among Iraqi and Iranian Kurds to Ocalan’s arrest and the broad 
participation in the first session of the Kurdish National Congress may be 
indications of a gradual integration of the Kurdish diasporas.
Not only has the Kurdish diaspora in the past two decades become 
increasingly oriented towards the situation and the struggle in the countries of 
origin, it has also come to make increasingly effective contributions to 
developments there. The role of the diaspora has been significant in the 
strengthening of Kurdish culture, in organising relief efforts for Iraqi Kurdistan, 
and in supporting the military as well the political struggles in Turkey. The 
revival of Kurdish writing, at a time when the Kurdish language was banned in 
Turkey, could only have taken place in exile. Without the repression that forced 
Kurdish intellectuals out of Turkey, Kurmanci literature would probably not have 
experienced its present renaissance. Meanwhile, Turkey has, under European 
pressure, relaxed its laws and Kurdish books and journals can be published there, 
though within narrow limits. Thus books that were first published in Europe 
could be reprinted in Turkey, and debates from the diaspora were carried back to 
Turkey and Kurdistan. Satellite television (MED-TV and its successors) has been 
an even more effective medium for bringing uncensored (or at least not state- 
censored) news and opinions to the Kurdish public in Turkey and neighbour 
countries. This again would have been unthinkable without the Kurdish diaspora.
Financial and Other Contributions by the Kurdish Diaspora
MED-TV illustrates yet another aspect of the Kurdish diaspora: its capacity of 
raising large sums of money. The operating costs alone may have amounted to 
some DM 50 million per year, which apparently was largely raised in the form of 
contributions by the Kurdish diaspora.33 Although MED-TV must have been by
33 Ocalan mentioned this amount to his Turkish interrogators and vehemently denied that 
MED-TV was financed with drugs money (as has been the standard Turkish claim). See the 
transcript o f Ocalan’s interrogation by three public prosecutors of Ankara’s State Security 
Court in: Unal lnan$ & Can Polat, eds., Imrali’da neler oluyor? Apo, PKK ve saklanan 
ger^ekler: iddialar, itiraflar, savunma, uyufturucu (Ankara: GUvenlik ve Yargi MUhabirleri 




























































































far the most costly of the various PKK activities in Europe, it appears safe to say 
that the total amount collected from the Kurdish community in Europe each year 
far exceeds the above sum. It is likely that a considerable part of the cost of the 
guerrilla war has also been borne by the diaspora. German official sources 
estimate the number of (Turkish) Kurds in Germany at around 400,000 to 
450,000, of whom the PKK can mobilise up to 50,000 for its manifestations. A 
conservative estimate of the number of Kurds from Turkey in all of Europe may 
be 600,000, of whom at least 60,000 may be PKK sympathisers.34 A simple 
calculation shows that the average sympathiser has raised several thousand 
German marks per year for the organisation — a high, but by no means 
impossible sum. The contributions have not always been voluntary; there have 
been numerous cases of outright extortion but the degree of pressure exerted has 
varied much from case to case. The PKK saw itself in the past years as a proto­
state and claimed the right to tax its “subjects” and even to impose “military 
service” on them. In practice it has rarely been able to exert the necessary degree 
of coercion; many of the contributions appear to have been more or less 
voluntary.
Drugs Traffic, the State and the PKK
It is necessary at this point to say a few things about the drugs trade, if only 
because it has often been claimed that this has been the PKK’s major source of 
finance.35 (And what clearer example could there be of transnational networks 
deluding and subverting the nation-state but this traffic?) There is no doubt that 
drugs smugglers have financed much of the PKK’s activities as well as part of 
Turkey’s non-conventional warfare against then PKK, but the PKK has always 
denied running its own smuggling operation.36 Since the onset of the guerrilla 
war, the smuggling of opium derivatives has become a major source of income in 
Turkey’s south-eastern provinces of Van and Hakkari, and the leading 
entrepreneurs have had to share their profits with both the PKK and police and 
military officials. Kurds have also been well-represented in the networks 
smuggling heroin from Turkey to the profitable European markets, and these have
sources, a much lower figure. During the first four months of its operation in 1995, $ 3.2 
million was spent, and the police found an amount of $ 11 million in a bank account. Haut, 
"Guerrilla et narcotrafic”, p. 237.
34 Higher estimates of the number o f Kurds in Europe are quite current. The Paris Kurdish 
Institute believes there are altogether 850,000, o f whom 500,000-600,000 in Germany, 
100,000-120,000 in France, 70,000-80,000 in the Netherlands, etc. (These estimates include 
the less numerous Iraqi and Iranian Kurds).
35 See for instance Haut, “Guerrilla et narcotrafic”.
36 See Ocalan's answers to his interrogators in: inan$ & Polat, Imrali'da neler oluyor?, p. 24, 
and the documents that the Turkish authorities claim prove the PKK’s direct involvement in 




























































































also been “taxed” by the PKK. The relationship of the drugs trade with the 
Kurdish conflict in Turkey is a complicated one, however. The armed conflict, 
and the resulting special privileges granted to the counter-insurgency forces, 
made an untrammelled growth of the drugs trade through eastern Turkey possible 
and enabled criminal networks to gain control over parts of the Turkish state 
apparatus. Some of the biggest smugglers were at once well-connected in the 
highest political circles in Turkey and financed various (non-military) PKK 
activities, notably a series of pro-Kurdish newspapers published in Istanbul.37
The most interesting case is perhaps that of Huseyin Bayba$in, the 
godfather of a large smuggling network who is presently held prisoner in the 
Netherlands. By his own public confession, well before his latest arrest, Bayba$in 
worked himself up from a small street trader in Istanbul to one of Turkey’s most 
successful businessmen, associating himself on the way with police officials of 
ever higher levels and finally becoming intimate with many members of Turkey’s 
political elite. He was recruited by one of the security services, received training 
for covert action, and was, so he claims, sent to Belgium and Britain to set up a 
marketing network for heroin brought into Belgium by a Turkish officer at NATO 
headquarters. He was arrested in Britain and spent five years in jail there. Upon 
his return to Turkey, he was told to infiltrate into PKK circles by financing a 
newspaper. As he later was to tell, this is how he discovered his Kurdish identity, 
which until then had not meant much to him. After several of his colleagues had 
fallen victim to death squad assassinations, apparently in retaliation for then- 
support of the PKK, he fled to Europe, where he gave a series of interviews to the 
Turkish and Kurdish press about the involvement of Turkish officials and 
politicians in organised crime. His claims appeared so outrageous that most 
people disbelieved them, until they were unexpectedly confirmed, at least in part, 
by a series of revelations on the state-mafia nexus in the Turkish press following 
a traffic accident in late 1996, in which the most notorious right-wing murderer 
and gangster, a top police official and the chief of the largest anti-PKK militia 
appeared to be travelling together.38
37 On this nexus of organised crime, politics, counter-insurgence and the Kurdish movement, 
see: Hamit Bozarslan, “Network-building, ethnicity and violence in Turkey” (occasional 
naper, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999).
8 Interviews with Bayba$in, most o f them very fragmentary, appeared in various media in 
Turkey and Europe. Two good attempts to present his story more systematically (on the basis 
of a number of interviews) are: Semih Hiijyilmaz, Susurluk ve kontrgerilla gerfegi (Istanbul: 
Evrensel Basim Yayin, 1997), pp. 158-181, and: Frank Bovenkerk & YUcel Yejilgoz, De maffia 
van Turkije (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff/Kritak, 1998), pp. 257-293. On the Susurluk accident and 





























































































Bayba$in’s network was one among many similar smuggling networks 
spreading into various European countries (although probably one of the largest). 
Both the PKK and various factions within Turkey’s police, intelligence and 
security forces as well as the political establishment have indirectly profited from 
the trade by skimming the smugglers’ profits. The transit trade though Turkey as 
well as the emergence of a lively processing industry in certain parts of eastern 
Turkey was much facilitated by the guerrilla and counter-insurgency operations; 
they should be considered as unforeseen side effects of the Kurdish conflict, 
which however have changed the parameters of the conflict. The street value of 
the total volume of drugs passing through Turkey is, according to some estimates, 
in the same order of magnitude as Turkey’s entire annual government budget. It is 
therefore readily understood that efforts to reach a final solution to the conflict 
may find powerful interests ranged against them.
Recruitment o f Guerrilla Fighters and Party Workers
The European diaspora has also been a fruitful field of recruitment, both of 
guerrilla fighters and of all sort of technical and administrative staff members for 
the PKK and its front organisations. One would expect young people who have 
grown up in Europe not to be particularly fit as mountain warriors (and given the 
high death toll, this may be a correct expectation), but the fact is that quite a few 
did in fact join the armed struggle. Many Kurdish families in Europe proudly 
mourn a son or daughter, or even more than one, who died as a $ehid, a martyr for 
the Kurdish cause, in eastern Turkey. As it did in Kurdistan itself, the PKK has 
attempted to persuade the Kurdish diaspora that military service in its ranks was a 
national duty that at least one member per family should fulfil.
More important that the recruitment of fighters, however, was the 
recruitment of skilled personnel. In the first years of the war, the PKK had little 
need for anything but fighters and it even urged young Kurds to drop out of the 
(Turkish) schools, which it considered as nothing but centres of colonial 
brainwashing. Its very military successes of the late 1980s and its growing 
popularity among the population transformed the organisation, giving rise to a 
large “civilian” wing, oriented towards political rather than military forms of 
struggle. It was only by recruiting numerous educated young people, many of 
them second generation immigrants in Europe, that the organisation could 
establish its dense network of information centres, workers’, students’ and 
women’s associations, publish books and journals in many different languages, 
staff the Parliament in Exile, set up MED-TV and its successors, etc. The 
diaspora has not only provided the PKK with a large pool of marginalised 
second-generation youth, for whom participation in the struggle gives meaning to 




























































































significant — pool of highly educated and successful young Kurds in Europe, 
whose skills have made a difference to the situation of the Kurds in Turkey and 
Iraq. From the mastery of foreign languages and international legal expertise to 
know-how about European institutions and technical facility with the new media, 
the diaspora has significantly enriched the Kurds’ repertory of skills for 
representing their common interests.
The Kurdish Question, a European Question
The politicisation of the Kurdish diaspora as well as increasing efforts by the 
Turkish authorities to maintain or regain their control of their Turkish and 
Kurdish subjects abroad have gradually made clear that the Kurdish question in 
not just an Iraqi, an Iranian, a Syrian or a Turkish problem but that it has also 
become a problem of European politics. At the most obvious, superficial level 
this is so because of violent protest actions by Kurds and the ever-present danger 
of clashes between nationalist Kurds and nationalist Kurds in European cities. 
The PKK — or, to be more precise, a secret organisation within the PKK — was 
responsible for a number of killings in Europe and numerous violent assaults on 
Turkish consulates, travel agencies, cafés and union buildings. Kurdish activities 
were from time to time violently countered by ultra-nationalist Turks (“Grey 
Wolves”), and there are strong indications that the Turkish hit-squads that were 
originally established to fight Armenian terrorism in the early 1980s have also 
been active against Kurdish targets in Europe.39 The “dirty war” carried on in 
Turkey has had its extensions in Europe.
A ban of the PKK in Germany and France has not seriously impeded this 
organisation’s capacity for organising mass action or violent assaults on, for 
instance, consulates or Turkish travel agencies. It was only after visits to Ocalan 
by high-level German officials and government advisors that the PKK could be 
persuaded to renounce on violence on German soil.40 Understandably, the 
German government did not wish to jeopardise the quiet thus gained by 
requesting Ôcalan’s extradition from Italy once he had been arrested there. The
19 See the report prepared for the Yilmaz government on the covert activities o f these right- 
wing hit men, who were recruited by the security services, in: Yeter Sava?, ed., 
Bandenrepublik Tiirkei? Der Susurlukberichl des Ministerialinspektors Kutlu Savaj (Bonn: 
Intemationaler Verein fiir Menschenrechte der Kurden, 1999).
40 Since 1995 Ocalan met, on different occasions, with the chief o f the Verfassungsschutz (the 
German internal intelligence service) and with the maverick right-wing CDU politician 
Lummer (both reputedly close to chancellor Kohl), with the director of the German Orient- 





























































































German refusal to do so caused considerable unease with its European partners, 
showing that the Kurdish question may even affect European inter-government 
relations.
The events surrounding Ocalan’s brief stay in Italy, his peregrinations in 
search for asylum and his ultimate extradition to Turkey have driven home the 
fact that the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is also a matter of European concern, and 
this not only from a law-and-order point of view. It was after all Italian members 
of parliament who had invited Ocalan to Italy, thereby provoking the crisis. A few 
months later, the Basque regional parliament’s determination to invite the 
Kurdish Parliament in Exile led to a conflict with the Spanish government, which 
was equally determined not to provoke Turkey by letting the controversial 
Kurdish representatives in. The presence of increasingly effective Kurdish legal 
and political representation in Europe, the Kurds’ use of European civil liberties 
and Turkey’s efforts to limit these (by demanding a ban of MED-TV and 
attempting to outlaw the Kurdish Parliament in Exile, for instance), force 
European politicians to take a stand on the Kurdish issue. And a political stand on 
the Kurdish issue is ultimately also a stand on regionalism and minority rights in 
Europe itself, as many regionalists are very much aware.
Turkey is not a European country in the sense of being a member or even a 
candidate member of the European Union. But it is a member of the Council of 
Europe (CE) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and it is party to a number of relevant international treaties. This makes 
the Kurdish question almost by definition a matter of concern for various 
European bodies. The OSCE, for instance, has accepted a number of far-reaching 
recommendations on the linguistic and educational rights of national minorities, 
which, if applied in Turkey, would go quite some way towards reducing the 
urgency of the present Kurdish question.41 Turkey’s present failure to live up to 
these standards is embarrassing to both Turkey and the OSCE, which so far has 
not yet taken Turkey to task but ultimately will have to do so. There are a number 
of reasons why many Europeans are quite unwilling to admit Turkey as a member 
of the European Union. The fear of being overrun by Turkey’s large and mobile 
labour force is one, anti-Muslim sentiment another. The more noble motives put 
forward, however, concern Turkey’s depressing human rights record and 
especially its handling of the Kurdish issue. This too has indirectly given the 
Kurdish question a central position in Turkish-European relations.
41 See the OSCE booklets “The Hague recommendations regarding the education rights of 
national minorities & explanatory note” (The Hague: The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic 
Relations, 1996), and ‘T he Oslo recommendations regarding the linguistic rights of national 





























































































The communications revolution and the emergence of an organised Kurdish 
diaspora have changed the nature of the Kurdish question. It is no longer a 
conflict that only involves the Kurds themselves and the states of the region but it 
has imposed itself on the political agendas of European countries and the USA as 
well. The end of the nation state, prophesied by some globalisation theorists, is 
not in sight yet but nation states are no longer the only significant actors in 
international politics and they have to acquiesce in limitations of their 
sovereignty. Although the Kurds are not united and certainly do not speak with a 
single voice, the international community has begun to recognise them, perhaps 
not as a separate nation yet but as Kurds and no longer just as citizens of Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq or Syria. Various persons and bodies representing Kurds — Kurdish 
institutes, party representatives, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile — have had 
high-level meetings with officials and politicians in many different countries. 
Satellite television has given Kurdish nationalists access to a powerful means of 
nation-building that had until recently been available to states only. The complex 
of transnational networks discussed in this paper has made the Kurds into much 
more of a nation than they were two decades ago. The efforts by the Iraqi and 
Turkish governments to suppress Kurdish nationalism by brutal military force 
have paradoxically contributed considerably to this process. Thousands of 
Kurdish villages were destroyed and millions of Kurds were forced to leave 
Kurdistan, but this has precisely had the effect of making Kurds from different 
regional backgrounds overcome their differences and of integrating many of them 
into more inclusive, non-territorial Kurdish networks. The re-emergence of the 
Kurds as an actor in the international political arena, after a period in which they 
appeared to be gradually integrated into the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi nation 
states, may turn out to be a greater challenge to these states than the guerrilla 
struggles that they have fought in the past decades.
Martin van Bruinessen
Utrecht University,
Department of Oriental Studies 
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